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 14 Suzuki Motor’s Expansion in India 
14.1  Introduction 
 Suzuki Motor Corporation (Suzuki) is an automobile and motorcycle manufacturer 
of compact cars such as Alto and Wagon R. Domestically, the company trails Toyota 
in terms of the annual car production, and is about the same size as Nissan and 
Honda. However, it is India’s number one automaker, boasting of more than 30 % 
share in the passenger vehicle market. Suzuki’s business in India began with a joint 
venture (JV) in 1982 with the Indian government and an investment in the state- 
owned Maruti Udyog. The company began manufacturing the Maruti 800 (Alto) in 
1983. The Maruti 800 became popularly known as the “people’s car of India,” 
thereby enabling Suzuki’s Indian subsidiary, Maruti Suzuki India (Maruti Suzuki), 
to enjoy overwhelming strength due to its brand, product line up, and dealer 
network. 
 However, the company’s climb to the top had not always been easy. India in the 
1980s produced goods based on a planned economy and employees had little regard 
for productivity, thus it took time to instill automobile production management 
methods among employees. In addition, Suzuki’s relationship with the Indian gov-
ernment, its partner in the JV, worsened, and it experienced large-scale employee 
strikes. Furthermore, with the growth of India’s auto market, competitors began to 
move into the market, posing a threat to Maruti Suzuki’s dominance as the number 
one automaker. Among foreign automakers, Korea’s Hyundai Motor Company 
grew in market share and the domestic automaker Tata Motors was not far behind as 
the third largest automaker in India. Tata Motors released the Tata Nano in July 
2009, which garnered a great deal of publicity with its INR 100,000 (approximately 
JPY 200,000) price tag. Therefore, price war with domestic manufacturers began to 
emerge. Additionally, Toyota and Honda, heretofore lacking presence in the Indian 
market, announced sales of its compact cars made for India, necessitating Suzuki to 
also gear up against its top tier competitors. 
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 This chapter analyzes Suzuki’s entry into the Indian market via the Maruti Suzuki 
subsidiary to deepen our understanding of the business environment in India and the 
changes therein. In addition, we consider the strategies that Maruti Suzuki should 
employ to maintain its dominance in the Indian auto market. 
14.2  Suzuki Motors Corporation and Its Overseas Business 
 Suzuki Motors Corporation was incorporated in 1920 as Suzuki Loom Manufacturing 
Co, and later came to be called Suzuki Motors Corporation in 1954, after launching 
a two-wheel and a light four-wheel business in the early 1950s. In 1990, it changed 
its name to the current form by changing “Suzuki” in Chinese characters to the same 
pronunciation in Japanese  katakana characters. At the end of 2011, it had 134 sub-
sidiaries (70 domestic and 64 overseas) and 37 associated companies. On a consoli-
dated basis, it generated revenues of JPY 2.5 trillion and had a workforce of 50,000 
employees. Suzuki created a niche for itself in Japan’s compact car market early as 
a maker of primarily small motorcycles and light vehicles. While its automobiles 
fall primarily within the light category, Suzuki’s growth in the compact and mid- 
sized car market segments has been startling. Apart from automobiles, Suzuki also 
manufactures and sells motorcycles and outboard motors. Two-thirds of its revenues 
come from overseas business (Tables  14.1 and  14.2 ).
 Suzuki has expanded its product line by primarily focusing on the light vehicles 
segment. In 1981, it strengthened its compact car business through agreements with 
General Motors (GM) that established operational and capital alliances. In 1983, it 
began the manufacture and sales of the Cultas; in 1984, it began exporting compact 
cars, supplying them to GM. In 1989, Suzuki created the CAMI in Canada as a 
50–50 JV with GM, kick starting its North American manufacture of compact cars. 
In 1998 and again in 2000, Suzuki received capital infusions from GM, and by 
2000, GM’s stake in Suzuki reached 20 %, leading to the announcement of a new 
strategic alliance with GM. However, in the latter half of that decade, GM lowered 
its stake to 3 % due to operational restructuring brought about by worsening perfor-
mance, and eventually sold all remaining Suzuki shares in November 2008, dissolv-
ing its capital alliance. In 2009, Suzuki entered into a capital partnership with 
Volkswagen (VW), which possessed a large share of the Chinese market, through a 
comprehensive partnership agreement. However, that partnership never material-
ized into a substantial business, and the comprehensive agreement was cancelled in 
2011. Suzuki entered into arbitration to seek the release of its shares owned by VW, 
to which VW has not agreed. The situation remains unresolved as of 2012. 
 Suzuki’s motto is “Don’t do what others do. Even in small markets, we will 
always strive to be number one in what we do.” The company is well known for its 
constant progressiveness, particularly in the motorcycle segment. For example, the 
fi rst large scooters with 400 and 650 cc engines, particularly popular in Europe, 
were sold by Suzuki. The company held its number one position for 34 years in a 
row, from 1973 to 2006, in the light vehicle segment in Japan, and also acts as an 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to Nissan and Honda. 
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 Suzuki worked on international expansion since its early stages, making its way 
into advanced nations, but fi nding it diffi cult in the North American market due to 
low demand for compact cars. It was in these circumstances that Suzuki received a 
request from the Indian government and entered the country’s market. Today, lever-
aging on its extensive line-up of compact vehicles, Suzuki is aggressively pursuing 
its entrance into developing countries like Pakistan and former communist bloc 
countries like Hungary (Table  14.3 ).
 Table 14.1  Suzuki overseas investments 
 1909  Formation of Suzuki Loom Works 
 1920  Incorporation as Suzuki Loom Manufacturing Co. 
 1963  Creation of US Suzuki Motor Corp. sales subsidiary 
 1967  Creation of Thai Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd. (Suzuki’s fi rst overseas motorcycle factory) 
 1973  Creation of Suzuki Canada Ltd. 
 1974  Creation of Suzuki Indonesia Manufacturing joint venture 
 1975  First overseas auto factory in Pakistan 
 1980  Creation of Suzuki Australia Pty. Ltd. sales joint venture 
 1981  Formation of operational alliance with GM and Isuzu 
 1982  Joint venture agreement with Indian government for Maruti Udyog 
 Production of autos at PAK Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd. in Pakistan 
 Signing of technological alliance with Spain’s Santana 
 1984  Creation of Suzuki New Zealand Ltd. (sales and production) 
 Creation of Suzuki France (sales) 
 Creation of Suzuki Motor GmbH Deutschland (sales) 
 1985  Creation of Suzuki of America Automotive Corp. (sales) 
 1986  Creation of American Suzuki Motor Corp. holding company 
 Agreement on joint production of autos with GM Canada 
 1988  Agreement with GM to strengthen capital ties 
 1989  Opening of Suzuki Egypt S.A.E. auto factory 
 1991  Formal signing of joint auto production agreement in Hungary, and creation of Magyar 
Suzuki Corporation 
 1993  Signing of joint passenger vehicle production agreement with China’s Chang’ an 
Automobile Group 
 1995  Withdrawal of capital from Spain’s Santana Motors 
 2000  Joint development and production between GM and Magyar Suzuki Corporation 
 2001  Suzuki Motor R&D Asia Co., Ltd. begins motorcycle R&D in Thailand 
 2002  Acquisition of majority shares of India’s Maruti, making it a subsidiary 
 2006  Reduction in capital ties with GM 
 2008  Cutting of capital ties with GM 
 2009  Severing of construction on auto factory in Thailand 
 Capital alliance with VW 
 2011  Cancelation of comprehensive agreement with VW 
 Arbitration to force VW to relinquish stake in Suzuki 
 Source : Various resources 
14.2 Suzuki Motors Corporation and Its Overseas Business
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 In the 3-year mid-term plan for the period 2007–2010, Suzuki set a 2010 goal of 
selling 2.95 million vehicles worldwide and producing 3.2 million vehicles. The 
company also made plans to expand its supply system by establishing new produc-
tion facilities in Thailand and introduce new models such as the A-Star into Indian 
and European markets. However, due to the economic recession caused by the 
fi nancial crisis and the subsequent sudden drop in demand, it was forced to revise a 
part of its new business plan, such as indefi nitely postpone the establishment of a 
new subsidiary in Russia and revise its production plans for its Thailand factory. 
Production volume in 2008 dropped to below 2.5 million vehicles worldwide, but 
due to the demand in the domestic sales for light vehicles, it recovered to approxi-
mately 2.8 million by fi scal year 2011 (1.02 million domestic and 1.78 million 
overseas). 
14.3  Suzuki’s Business in India 
 Amid the global economic downturn precipitated by the Lehman Brothers bank-
ruptcy, Suzuki’s subsidiary in India, Maruti Suzuki, was experiencing spectacular 
success. Thirty percent of Suzuki’s overall profi t on a consolidated basis came from 
India. As the “people’s car of India,” Suzuki’s Maruti 800 established a strong brand 
recognition. In 2007, Osamu Suzuki, the president of the company, received the 
“Padma Bhushan” award from the Indian government for the company’s contribu-
tion to the Indian economy. 
 India’s auto market began with knockdown production, or a simple assembly of 
imported parts, by GM and Ford during the 1930s. Hindustan Motors was formed in 
1942, followed by other auto makers such as Premier Automobiles, TELCO (cur-
rently Tata Motors), Ashok Leyland, and Mahindra & Mahindra, all established 
using domestic capital. 
 Table 14.3  Number of passenger vehicle sales by region (units: in thousands) 
 Region  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
 NA  85  99  113  112  85  41  33 
 Cent. & SA  34  44  48  67  76  58  71 
 East Asia  264  260  234  280  278  332  391 
 Oceania  10  19  21  28  27  27  31 
 West Asia  562  628  767  841  799  939  1,233 
 Mid-East  12  12  19  24  28  19  16 
 Africa  10  14  22  35  44  29  35 
 Europe  243  289  306  344  301  281  243 
 Total  1,219  1,365  1,531  1,732  1,641  1,727  2,053 
 Japan  673  707  691  673  665  622  588 
 Source : 2011 Suzuki Corporate Overview 
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 The production technology of these early domestic automakers was low, 
 therefore, the Indian government, in the intention to develop automakers that could 
produce compact cars with good fuel consumption at low cost, requested Japanese 
automakers to enter the market. This is how Suzuki made its entrance in the Indian 
market. In 1982, the Indian government and Suzuki entered into a JV agreement and 
began the production of automobiles through India’s state-owned manufacturer, 
Maruti Udyog. The automobile industry at the time thought of this as rash, and 
some inside offi cials opposed the agreement. However, Osamu Suzuki, the presi-
dent at the time, said, “No one else is going to India, so we have an opportunity. We 
were the lowest-ranked among domestic manufacturers, and wanted to be at the fi rst 
place somewhere.” It was with this sense of passion that he made the decision to 
begin operations in India. At fi rst, production began with Suzuki only retaining a 
26 % minority stake in Maruti Udyog. Although the Indian government had 
requested for Suzuki to own what was then the foreign ownership maximum of 
40 %, Suzuki, keeping investment risk in mind, determined that 26 % was the most 
it could invest without compromising veto rights for major management issues. 
Suzuki also ensured that its approval of important policy matters, such as CEO 
changes, was included as a condition in the JV agreement, thereby allowing Suzuki 
to instill Japanese management styles into the JV, despite its hold as a minority 
participant. The 1980s was a time of both merits and demerits for JVs with state- 
owned enterprises. Because Maruti was state-owned, employees were unconcerned 
about productivity and it took time to implement a production management system. 
For example, employees were not very particular about work hour schedules, mak-
ing it diffi cult to implement production lines with routings managed in seconds. By 
training these employees in Japanese factories, the company was able to elicit a 
desire to master automobile production management systems. Executives, who 
were used to their private offi ces, were baffl ed by Suzuki’s system of having all 
employees together in one large room. However, today this same system is well 
received by Indian employees as it enables better communication. 
 Supply could not meet automotive demand in India during the 1980s, and 
because Suzuki was the only foreign automaker in India, it was able to take advan-
tage of this and hire the very best Indian engineers. It was also able to smoothly 
expand its sales network through its JV. Because customers had to buy whatever 
was produced, auto dealers did not have to put in much effort to sell their vehicles. 
However, the country needed service stations for auto repairs caused by the poor 
condition of Indian roads. At the time, Maruti’s dealers were local celebrities who 
sold motorcycles and ran other businesses, and Maruti was able to earn their trust 
due to it being a state-owned company. 
 India was beset by a severe fi scal crisis in 1990 that brought about massive 
deregulation to transition itself into a market economy because it determined that 
the economic system up until that point, with its tangle of regulations, was the 
source of the crisis. As part of that transition, regulations governing foreign capital 
were relaxed in 1991, and at the Indian government’s request in 1992, Suzuki 
increased its stake in the JV to 50 %. However, differences of opinion with the 
14 Suzuki Motor’s Expansion in India
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government regarding planned factory expansion locations and funding sources 
 surfaced in the late 1990s. Additionally, Suzuki felt that the executive nominated by 
the Indian government to head the JV in 1997 was unsuitable for the role, causing 
the company to take an extreme measure and once again oppose the Indian govern-
ment. Osamu Suzuki casually commented in an interview with a  Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun reporter: “We’ll have an abacus in our left hand and come out punching 
with our right. We don’t need to compromise” (September 25, 1997,  Nihon Keizai 
Shinbun , p. 24). Insisting that the Indian government was violating the contractual 
agreement to “select appropriate personnel as company president,” Suzuki went so 
far as to take action against the government in both the Delhi High Court and 
London’s International Court of Arbitration. The Indian government did not think 
that Suzuki, a mere private company, would react so strongly. Finally, in 1998, the 
two parties settled. The dispute caused interruption to new car models, causing 
delayed management decisions on new car sales by Maruti Udyog. 
 Labor unions in India are very powerful and many foreign manufacturers have 
been troubled by labor disputes. Suzuki is no exception. Increased market competi-
tion made it diffi cult to maintain traditional wage structures that provided incentives 
depending on production volumes. The labor union reacted negatively when the 
company proposed inhibitory changes to wages in 2000, triggering a large-scale 
strike lasting 88 days during October 2000 through January 2001. During that time, 
the labor union involved politicians and India’s Department of Commerce in an 
effort to shake up Suzuki by any political means possible. However, Suzuki stayed 
fi rm to its stance that it would not hire workers who could not follow directions. 
 Suzuki took a controlling stake of Maruti Udyog in 2002, and in 2003, some of 
the government’s shares were sold on the stock exchange. The government sold all 
of its remaining shares in 2007, at which time Suzuki was able to cut all capital ties 
to the government. It is thought that the Indian government came to this decision by 
judging the outcome of its attempts to interject itself into Maruti’s management in 
the late 1990s, and acknowledged that management of the company was better left 
to Suzuki (Tables  14.4 and  14.5 ).
 From the outset, Suzuki implemented a number of labor practices, such as a 
“bottom–up approach,” at Maruti Suzuki. For example, executives at Suzuki sit 
among employees at the cafeteria and eat the same food so as to facilitate commu-
nication. This was diffi cult to practice in India with its strict caste system, but Maruti 
Suzuki was insistent. At the time, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi praised Suzuki as 
having “Transplanted Japan’s work culture into India.” Today, this “bottom–up 
approach” is the norm among Indian executives, and there is now an environment in 
place allowing for manufacturing the Suzuki way. To fully implement the Suzuki 
way of manufacturing, the company sent Indian employees to Japan to train them 
on-site in locations such as Hamamatsu. However, the increasing numbers of vet-
eran Indian workers now make it possible to conduct training locally, resulting in 
fewer trainees being sent to Japan. 
 Maruti Suzuki’s production volume steadily increased until 2010, but declined 
by 100,000 units in 2011 to approximately 1.13 million units due to a large strike 
14.3 Suzuki’s Business in India
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the previous year. Of that number, one million units were sold domestically, and 
130,000 were exported to other markets. The Indian market for both passenger and 
commercial vehicles, on the other hand, increased from approximately three million 
units in 2010 to 3.3 million in 2011, causing Suzuki’s market share to drop from 
almost 40 % in 2010 to about 30 % in 2011. These numbers, however, include all 
vehicles, and Maruti Suzuki’s share of passenger vehicles was higher, at around 
38 % in 2011 (Table  14.6 ).
 Table 14.5  Development of Maruti Suzuki 
 1971  Sanjay Gandhi (the son of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi) applauds company 
based on a compact “people’s car” concept 
 1972 
 1981  Maruti created as state-owned company 
 1982  Maruti joint venture and license agreement with Suzuki 
 1983  Production and sales of Maruti 800 (Alto) 
 1984  Sales of Omni (Every) 
 1985  Sales of Gypsy (Jimny) 
 1990  Sales of Esteem (Cultas) 
 1991 
 1992  Suzuki increases ownership from 40 to 50 % 
 1993  Sales of Zen (Servo) 
 1994  Cumulative production of 1 mn vehicles, opening of Number 2 Factory 
 1997  Cumulative production of 2 mn vehicles 
 1998 
 1999  Opening of Number 3 Factory 
 Sales of Baleno (Crescent) and Wagon R 
 2000  Sales of Alto, cumulative production of 3 mn vehicles 
 2001  Sales of Versa (Every Landy) 
 2002  Maruti Udyog becomes Suzuki subsidiary 
 2003  Maruti Suzuki gets listed on the stock market, cumulative production of 4 mn vehicles 
 2004  Decision to create engine production company 
 2005  Cumulative production of 5 mn vehicles, sales of Swift 
 2006  Manesar Factory begins production 
 Sales of Zen and Estiro (Wagon R) 
 Cumulative production of 6 mn vehicles 
 2007  Corporate name becomes Maruti Suzuki India Limited 
 Sales of SX4 and Grand Vitara 
 2008  Sales of Swift Desire 
 Cumulative production of 7 mn vehicles 
 Sales of A-Star 
 2009  Sales of Ritz (Splash) 
 2010  Annual sales of 1 mn vehicles 
 2011  Cumulative production of 10 mn vehicles 
 Source : Various resources 
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 In addition to Maruti Suzuki maintaining its top market share in India, the 
 company planned to develop India as a compact vehicle export hub and develop-
ment center for compact cars bound for global markets. The A-Star model, which 
hit the global markets in 2009, had a production volume set at 140,000 vehicles, of 
which 100,000 were exported to Europe that same year. Exports to Europe have 
been stagnant due to the slumping European economy, but Suzuki is preparing 
toward a transition development of compact vehicles to India. As part of that pro-
cess, in 2013, it is planning on opening a development center with a test course in 
Rohtak, a city in the state of Haryana. Modifi cations such as the increased engine 
room to the 660 cc Japanese light vehicle Alto to place a one liter engine, and body 
modifi cations to the ECCO passenger car based on Japan’s commercial vehicle 
Every, have been carried out locally. Testing these completed vehicles was previ-
ously conducted in Japan, but it can now be conducted in India with the opening of 
a testing center, thereby considerably shortening the development phase for prod-
ucts going to both Indian and other foreign markets. 
 Maruti Suzuki is also proactive in its CRS activities, and has opened Maruti 
Driving Schools (MDS). As of March 2009, more than 50 of these schools were in 
place, compared to 34 in the previous year. This number grew to 163 by November 
2011. Aiming to reduce traffi c accidents, Suzuki considers education on safe driv-
ing as part of its responsibility as the nation’s top automaker. 
14.4  Supply Chain Creation and Local Development 
Infrastructure 
 Cars are made up of several parts, each of which is manufactured by as many part 
makers. The auto industry has a hierarchical structure, with the automakers at the 
top as assemblers, working directly with the relatively large Tier 1 suppliers, who in 
turn are supplied by many Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers. Creating a supply chain with 
these parts suppliers is critical to producing cars in India. 
 Table 14.6  Number of production and sales by Maruti Suzuki 
 1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
 Production 
volume 
 407,589  350,374  358,108  359,960  472,908  540,415  572,127 
 Domestic 
sales 
 384,892  335,461  340,182  330,175  420,947  487,402  527,038 
 Exports  21,450  15,300  12,233  32,240  51,175  48,899  34,781 
 2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
 Production 
volume 
 667,048  777,017  774,623  1,025,466  1,270,959  1,133,695 
 Domestic 
sales 
 635,629  711,818  722,144  870,790  1,132,654  1,006,316 
 Exports  39,295  53,024  70,023  147,575  138,305  127,379 
 Source : Maruti Suzuki India Limited ( 2011 ) 
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 In the fi rst half of the 1980s, when Suzuki was just beginning passenger car 
 production in partnership with Maruti Suzuki, there were no companies in India that 
could manufacture auto parts that met Suzuki’s quality standards. Thus, Maruti 
Suzuki began producing passenger cars by furnishing its factories with welding and 
painting equipment and assembling the parts and materials that were imported from 
Japan. At the behest of the Indian government to procure parts domestically to 
develop an auto parts industry in India, Maruti Suzuki began sourcing tyres and bat-
teries domestically. Since buses and trucks were being produced domestically, India 
already possessed the technology to produce these items. Although it was not easy 
to apply these technologies to compact cars, the company was able to eventually 
localize the procurement with the cooperation of Indian manufacturers. 
 At the time, Tata and Mahindra & Mahindra were manufacturing trucks and 
buses. With all necessary parts manufactured internally, these companies never con-
sidered the development of a parts supplier network. With Suzuki’s instruction, a 
Phased Manufacturing Program to develop a local Indian parts suppliers’ network 
began. For example, a technology called “zone toughening” is used on windshields 
that can alter the size of a crack depending on its location on the windshield. It was 
necessary to bring this technology from Japan to make windshields in India. Parts 
suppliers themselves possessed the technology, so Suzuki decided to form a three- 
way JV between Suzuki, Maruti Suzuki, and parts suppliers. The same applied to 
plastic bumpers, since India at the time only produced metal bumpers. In this man-
ner, Suzuki steadily pressed forward with creating a local supply chain. 
 Circumstances changed dramatically with the economic liberalization policies of 
the 1990s as major foreign parts manufacturers began to expand into India. The 
Phased Manufacturing Program ended in 1992 and Maruti Suzuki began procuring 
parts from Indian companies, which by then could produce high quality parts. 
Today, Maruti Suzuki procures more than 90 % of its parts domestically, importing 
only a very small percentage from Japan. However, in many cases, the company 
procures parts from the Indian subsidiaries of Tier 1 Japanese parts suppliers, which 
in turn import critical parts from Japan for further assembly in India. 
 For example, Denso, a supplier of electronics controlling units (ECUs), fuel 
pumps, and injectors, primarily imports critical parts from Japan and assembles 
them in India. It procures some parts, such as plastic and die cast locally, but India 
still lacks adequate Tier 2 suppliers. Furthermore, Japanese suppliers at this level 
are mostly small- and medium-sized businesses, with only few expanding into 
India. “Increasing the amount of local procurement is essential to reducing costs, 
and automakers are very cooperative. We cannot lower the quality, but we do need 
to change our thinking, such as decreasing the functionality of Indian specifi ca-
tions” (an oral interview with employee at Denso’s Indian subsidiary). 
 Maruti Suzuki began producing diesel cars in 2006. Demand in India for diesel- 
run cars is high, and depending on the model, it can be higher than demand for gas- 
driven cars. Suzuki did not possess diesel engine technology, so it received technical 
assistance from Fiat, on account of its alliance with GM, which had a capital alli-
ance with Suzuki at the time. Because the ECUs for diesel engines were manufac-
tured by the Italian fi rm Magneti Marelli, in 2008 Maruti Suzuki formed a JV with 
Magneti Marelli and began production of diesel engines in India. 
14.4 Supply Chain Creation and Local Development Infrastructure
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 As Maruti Suzuki moved ahead with the localization of its production processes, it 
also proceeded in terms of creating infrastructure to enable the development of com-
pact cars in India. Up until that time, new cars introduced into the Indian market were 
models already in mass production in Japan that had been modifi ed according to Indian 
specifi cations. However, with the introduction of the Swift model in 2005, Suzuki com-
pletely changed course and began the simultaneous production of cars of the same 
specifi cations and quality of those produced in Japan, Hungary, India, and China. 
 Suzuki took a step forward with the release of the A-Star. Manufactured in India 
and made for the global markets, the model was sold not only in India but was also 
exported to Europe. Maruti Suzuki and Suzuki periodically had exchanges between 
the two companies’ engineers, helping the growth of development infrastructure in 
India. There are three stages in local design. The fi rst stage is the ability to design 
the front and rear of the body, specifi cally the shapes of the lights and front grill. 
Maruti Suzuki is already at this level. The second stage is the ability to design the 
entire body, and the third is the development of the entire vehicle, including the 
platform. According to a Maruti Suzuki local staff “The company would like to be 
positioned at level two in the next few years.” 
14.5  India’s Automotive Industry: Huge Opportunities 
and Increasing Competition 
 Total sales volume of vehicles in India was 3.3 million in 2011, and although it 
compares unfavorably to China’s 18 million, it is still the sixth largest market in the 
world. With an estimated annual growth rate of 10 %, the Indian market will cer-
tainly surpass Japan, Brazil, and Germany in the near future, becoming the third 
largest in the world, behind only China and the US. Particularly amid the shrinking 
auto markets of the US and Japan due to the Lehman Brothers-induced economic 
recession, growth in the auto markets in emerging nations is astonishing (Table  14.7 ).
 India’s potential as an auto market can also be gleaned from the relatively low 
market penetration of vehicles. As of 2010, population per vehicle was 57, more 
than double that of China’s score of 27. Accompanied by nationwide economic 
growth, India’s overall wage levels are also increasing. The middle class population 
percentage with the means to purchase a car (i.e., those with an annual income 
greater than INR 200,000) has risen to 10 % of the total population and is estimated 
to grow in the future. 
 Compact cars have the highest share of India’s auto market. According to 2009 
data, more than one million of the 1.4 million passenger vehicles manufactured that 
year fell into the compact car category (Table  14.8 ).
 Maruti Suzuki shows overwhelming strength within the compact car category, with 
approximately half of the market share, followed by Korea’s Hyundai Motor 
Company and India’s Tata Motors. In terms of 2011 passenger car market share, 
Hyundai Motor Company is somewhat ahead of Tata Motors, although Tata has an 
overwhelming lead in terms of total production volume when commercial vehicles 
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are included. Tata Motors began selling the Nano, a low-priced vehicle, in 2009. It 
began factory operations for Nano production in the state of Gujarat in June 2010, 
and currently has the capacity to produce 250,000 vehicles annually. It plans to 
increase this number to 350,000 vehicles in the future, giving Nano sales the poten-
tial to dramatically change the composition of the compact car market. Next in 
terms of market share is Mahindra & Mahindra, which primarily manufactures 
SUVs. Toyota, GM, Ford, and Honda hover around the list, at sales volumes between 
50,000 and 100,000 vehicles each. These standings are based on domestic Indian 
sales, although in terms of production volume including exports, Hyundai Motor 
Company is far ahead of Tata Motors. Renault Nissan has also built an export pro-
duction facility and plans to manufacture 240,000 vehicles annually in 2012 
(Table  14.9 ).
 Of the many parts procured from parts suppliers, auto production facilities spe-
cial order most parts. Parts that require a high degree of quality or precision are 
sometimes imported from the manufacturer’s country of origin, but these manufac-
turers must increase the percentage of locally procured parts to reduce production 
costs. Thus, automakers often procure from domestic suppliers while helping them 
develop. As a result, automakers have clusters of parts suppliers near their facilities. 
India has three large automotive clusters formed by suppliers: the Delhi areas where 
Maruti Suzuki and Honda Siel are located; the Mumbai areas, including Pune, 
where Tata Motors is located; and southern India where Hyundai Motor Company 
(in Chennai), Renault Nissan (Chennai), and Toyota Kirloskar (Bangalore) are 
located (Fig.  14.1 ). 
 Below are overviews of Maruti Suzuki’s main competitors in India. 
 Table 14.7  Market size of automotives by country (units: 10,000s of vehicles) 
 Country  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
 China  577  722  879  934  1,364  1,806  1,851 
 US  1,744  1,705  1,646  1,349  1,060  1,180  1,304 
 Japan  585  574  535  508  461  496  421 
 Brazil  171  193  247  283  315  352  363 
 Germany  361  377  348  343  405  320  351 
 India  144  175  199  198  227  304  329 
 Russia  181  225  289  322  160  211  291 
 France  255  250  258  257  272  271  269 
 UK  283  273  280  248  222  229  225 
 Italy  250  261  278  242  236  215  195 
 Iran  101  110  115  130  142  160  164 
 Canada  163  167  169  167  148  158  162 
 Korea  117  120  127  122  145  156  158 
 Australia  99  96  105  101  94  104  101 
 Source : Fourin:  2011 World Car Almanac 
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14.5.1  Hyundai Motor India (HMI) Limited 
 HMI was created in 1996 in Chennai and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hyundai 
Motor Company. In second place, it holds approximately 20 % of the passenger car 
market, and has a fi rm position behind Suzuki. It has been noted that, since its estab-
lishment in 1996, HMI was able to heighten its presence in the market with success-
ful product strategies. Until 2005, most cars sold in the Indian auto market were 
variants of older models from advanced nations, but HMI introduced what was then 
 Table 14.9  Sales volume by manufacturer in India 
 Brand 
 Non-commercial vehicles  Passenger cars  Utility vehicles 
 2010  2011  2010  2011  2010  2011 
 Maruti Suzuki  1,065,732  997,281  908,742  844,001  156,990  153,280 
 Tata Motors  723,853  802,866  249,893  246,874  91,830  103,310 
 Hyundai  356,712  373,709  356,501  372,259  211  1,450 
 Mahindra & 
Mahindra 
 284,477  361,167  8,163  16,204  164,066  210,093 
 Toyota  74,762  136,148  11,307  73,094  63,455  63,054 
 GM  110,361  111,056  90,352  88,657  20,009  22,399 
 Ford  83,887  96,271  80,685  93,268  3,202  3,003 
 Ashok Leyland  80,474  84,720  –  –  –  – 
 VW  32,626  78,410  32,623  78,404  3  6 
 Honda  62,872  47,548  62,204  47,222  668  326 
 Eicher Motors  35,464  45,229  –  –  –  – 
 Skoda  20,135  30,741  19,729  28,569  406  2,172 
 Force Motors  24,088  28,336  –  –  4,363  6,176 
 Nissan  7,161  22,893  6,719  22,585  442  308 
 Fiat  21,948  16,733  21,948  16,733  –  – 
 SML Isuzu  11,287  12,783  –  –  –  – 
 Piaggio Vehicles  9,553  11,188  –  –  –  – 
 Asia Motor Works  6,008  9,478  –  –  –  – 
 BMW  4,741  8,042  4,394  5,162  347  2,880 
 Hindustan Motors  11,136  5,890  8,279  3,545  2,451  2,141 
 M-Benz compact  4,210  5,634  3,945  5,003  265  631 
 Audi  2,449  4,718  1,762  3,656  687  1,062 
 Renault  –  1,401  –  1,137  –  264 
 Volvo  1,670  1,360  –  –  –  – 
 ICML  748  428  –  –  748  428 
 M-Benz mid-size 
commercial 
 147  178  –  –  –  – 
 JCBL  28  13  –  –  –  – 
 Total  3,036,529  3,294,221  1,867,246  1,946,373  510,143  572,983 
 Source : Fourin:  2011 World Car Almanac 
14.5 India’s Automotive Industry: Huge Opportunities and Increasing Competition
238
its latest model, the Santro, into the market, rapidly acquiring a large market share. 
HMI is also a source of exports for Hyundai Motor Company, the largest such 
exporter in India. It has built a supply chain of Korean parts suppliers to accompany 
its growth in production volume, and currently procures more than 90 % of its parts 
from local sources. 
14.5.2  Tata Motors 
 Tata Motors, a member of the Tata Group, has maintained a market share of 60 % in 
trucks and buses. Internationally, the company has grown aggressively through 
M&As, acquiring Korea’s Daewoo in 2004 and forming Daewoo Commercial Vehicle 
Company Ltd., and investing in Spain’s Hispano Carrocera in 2006, before fully 
acquiring it in 2009. It purchased Jaguar/Land Rover (JLR) in June 2008, gaining 
footholds into the luxury car and SUV markets. Within the domestic vehicle market, 
its compact car, Indica, is a popular model, and it introduced the mini-car Nano in 
2009. The company also plans on introducing a new car category that fi ts between the 
Indigo and Nano models. However, no increase can be seen in the market share of the 
Indigo in the compact category in which Maruti Suzuki and HMI are strong. 






















 Fig. 14.1  Locations of major car manufacturer in India 
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14.5.3  Mahindra & Mahindra 
 In addition to automobiles, Mahindra & Mahindra is spread across a wide array of 
industries, including agricultural equipment, infrastructure development, and IT 
services. However, within the automotive industry, it is positioned somewhere in 
between the passenger and commercial vehicle markets, having a 50 % market 
share in the utility vehicle segment (its core model is the Scorpio). As for foreign 
partners, it formed a JV with Renault and introduced a low-priced mid-sized model 
called the Logan, although sales of this model have not been strong. The company 
is unique in terms of its new technological advancements and product development. 
For example, the company develops diesel hybrid vehicles. However, it is said that 
Indian market is not yet ready for hybrid vehicles. 
14.5.4  Toyota Kirlroskar Motors 
 In 1997, Toyota entered into a JV with India’s Kirloskar Motors to form Toyota 
Kirlroskar Motors. For a long time, the JV operated in the Indian market with its 
SUV, the Innova, although the Indian market did not receive high priority from the 
Toyota Group at that time. However, in 2010, Toyota decided to capitalize the com-
pact car market in India, an automotive hot spot, and introduced the Etios model, a 
car with a price tag in the INR 500,000 range. Sales of the Etios have been strong, 
with Toyota selling 70,000 in 2011. 
14.5.5  Honda Siel 
 In 1995, Honda’s automotive division created a JV with India’s Usha International, 
calling it Honda Siel Cars India Limited. This company manufactures and sells the 
City and Accord, but even after more than 10 years since its formation, its annual 
production level remains at approximately 50,000–60,000 vehicles. With prices 
ranging from INR 670,000 for the City on the low end to INR 1.7 million for the 
Accord on the high end, Honda targeted the growing affl uent consumers with these 
models. The company introduced an even lower-end model called the Jazz in 2008 
before introducing the compact Brio in 2011, which was priced lower than INR 
500,000. The release of this vehicle coincided with the Bangkok fl oods, disrupting 
production in the latter half of 2011, after which Honda’s activities have been note-
worthy. Honda’s local procurement rate at 70 % is lower than Suzuki’s and 
Hyundai’s, which are at more than 90 %, increasing this number to compete in the 
lower-priced models is important. In September 2012, Honda dissolved its JV 
announcing that it would move forward as a wholly owned subsidiary. 
 Suzuki’s broad lineup of models is ready to compete with these companies. The 
company is currently focused on compact cars (i.e., cars with lengths of less than 
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four meters and engines of less than 1.2 l) and because this category is subject to 
preferential tax treatment (excise tax lowered to 12 % versus the 24 %), sales vol-
ume is expected to grow. This class of cars can be divided into three categories: (1) 
entry-level (800 cc class, such as the Maruti 800 and Alto); (2) A2 (1,000 cc class, 
such as the Wagon R and Hyundai’s i10); and (3) A2+ (1,200 cc class, such as the 
Swift and Hyundai’s i20). While the A2 is the most popular, the growth rate of the 
A2+ is also high. However, the A2+ category is very competitive, with Tata’s Indica, 
VW’s Polo, and Ford’s Figo vying for the same customers. Further, Nissan’s Micra 
(March), Toyota’s Etios, and Honda’s Brio also fall under this category, further 
intensifying competition. 
 Suzuki is also implementing its strategy to increase its lineup of cars for upper-
class consumers. In 2009, it began selling a new model sedan, the SX4, and an SUV, 
the Grand Vitara (Escudo), and in February 2011 it introduced the Kizashi into the 
Indian market, a model previously sold in North America. The question that must 
now be answered by Suzuki’s management is how to allocate its limited manage-
ment resources (Fig.  14.2 ). 
 Fig. 14.2  Price range of car by model in India (As of 2010) ( Source : various resources) 
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14.6  Significance of This Case Study and Suggested 
Questions 
 This chapter discussed Maruti Suzuki, a case study of a Japanese company’s entry 
into the Indian market. Among India’s manufacturing industries, the automotive 
industry is the most watched, and many local subsidiaries of Japanese companies 
are in the automotive sector. Chapter  6 analyzed the Neemrana Industrial Park, 
which was built to attract auto parts suppliers into the Indian market. A detailed 
analysis has been conducted not only on Maruti Suzuki’s business, but also on the 
trends in the Indian auto market, competitors, and local business environments. 
Accordingly, the authors would like readers to examine management strategies, alli-
ance strategies, marketing, and R&D as explained in this volume, and use these as 
materials to think about how the overall business strategies should be constructed. 
 Using this case study, we recommend exploring the following points to further 
deepen your understanding of global strategies:
•  Why was Suzuki successful in India? The company decided to enter the India 
market in the 1980s, when it was still risky to do so. What were the primary fac-
tors that led to Maruti Suzuki’s success? Why were these actions important? 
•  Summarize the competitive environment within India’s auto market using 
Porter’s fi ve Force model (explained in Chap.  2 ). Explain the strategy Maruti 
Suzuki should pursue based on that model. 
•  Explain Maruti Suzuki’s marketing strategy to date. How does the company seg-
ment and target customers? Considering future market competition, what market 
strategy will be most appropriate for the company in the future? 
 Maruti Suzuki is planning on building an R&D center in India (in Rohtak, near 
Delhi). Is this a good decision? What in your opinion should this R&D center focus 
on? (refer to Chap.  11 for categorizations of overseas R&D activities) 
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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